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Case Study

Averting Financial
Exploitation and Undue
Influence through
Legislation

by Kathy Pryor, JD
Virginia Poverty Law Center

Objectives
1. Explain what financial exploitation is.
2. Examine the elements of undue
influence through case studies.
3. Consider the reasons undue
influence is so difficult to address
legislatively.
Background
Financial exploitation is the illegal
or improper use of someone else’s
money or belongings for the user’s
own personal benefit. Virginia Code
§ 63.2-100 defines “adult exploitation” as “the illegal use of an incapacitated adult or his resources for
another’s profit or advantage.” In
fiscal year 2014, Virginia’s Adult
Protective Services substantiated
1,079 complaints of financial
exploitation. Too often, exploita-
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tion occurs at the hands of a trusted
family member, caregiver, agent
under a power of attorney, or others
abusing a position of trust. For
many years, advocates and legislators have attempted to craft laws
which would deter those who
would victimize vulnerable Virginians through new or enhanced criminal penalties, or which would
improve the ability of victims to
recover their lost resources from the
exploiter through the civil courts.
Existing criminal law does not protect the victim who has capacity but
is, nonetheless, manipulated or
induced to act in ways that she
would not otherwise act by someone in a position of influence or
trust who takes advantage of the
victim’s vulnerability and trust in
order to obtain the victim’s money
or property. The civil law does
address this problem, but cases are
difficult and time-consuming to
bring and it is often difficult to find
an attorney willing to represent
these victims. The problem, often
referred to as “undue influence,”
has been a particularly ‘difficult nut
to crack’ legislatively. A victim’s
competency or capacity, that is, her
ability to understand the nature and
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consequences of whatever document she is signing or whatever
transaction she is entering into, may
be fairly clear. Undue influence,
however, is far less precise. Technically, the victim may understand
what she is doing, but she may act
out of fear of the consequences of
not acting as the exploiter wishes or
out of trust that the exploiter must
be acting in her best interests.
When the exploiter is a close family
member, the line between receipt of
a “gift” and a criminal or improper
act of exploitation becomes blurred
and difficult to prove. A victim’s
ambivalence about bringing criminal charges against a beloved relative or trusted advisor makes criminal charges challenging to sustain
and prove. In addition, legislators
are especially reluctant to pass laws
which create a new crime or
enhanced criminal penalties in situations where the lines between a
good actor and a bad one are indistinct and subjective.
Case Study #1
One month after the sudden death
of his wife of more than 50 years,
Mr. Jones’ daughter Sarah offers to
move in with her father and care for
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him, if he would first deed his
home to her. Sarah had helped her
parents with transportation to the
doctors and with their finances for
the last five years because his
vision had deteriorated due to glaucoma. Mr. Jones, age 83, had
depended on his wife for his care
for several years. In addition to
glaucoma, he has breathing difficulties from emphysema, severe arthritis that limits his ability to get
around, and he uses a wheelchair.
Before moving in, Sarah insists that
her father go with her to her attorney to have a deed drawn up. Fearful of living alone, he agrees and
signs the deed. Six months later,
Mr. Jones contacts an attorney after
being served with an unlawful
detainer: his daughter Sarah is trying to evict him.
Case Study #2
Mrs. Smith, an 85 year old widow,
goes to live with her son and his
wife because she is no longer able
to live independently in her own
home. She is unable to read or
write; she has completely lost sight
in one eye and has lost several of
her toes to diabetes; and she suffers
with high blood pressure. She cannot walk, prepare her own meals, or
leave the house without assistance,
and she is totally dependent upon
her son and daughter-in-law for
food, transportation, medical care,
and many other essential and nonessential needs. Mrs. Smith owned
her own home and had paid it off
before she moved in with her son.
While she was living in her son’s
home, he asked her to sign a paper
which he said was needed so that he
and his wife could handle her
checks and help her pay her bills.
No one read the document to Mrs.
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Smith and she signed with an ‘X’,
not realizing that she was in fact
signing over the deed to her home
to her son and daughter-in-law.
Only several months later when her
son began talking about boarding
up her home did Mrs. Smith learn
that her home was no longer in her
name but was in her son and daughter-in-law’s names. While she fully
intended to leave her son the home
at her death (and had drawn up a
will to that effect), she never
intended to convey the home to him
during her lifetime.
Common Elements of Undue
Influence:
The cases of Mr. Jones and Mrs.
Smith demonstrate some elements
that are often present in financial
exploitation cases in general, and in
undue influence cases in particular.
These include:
• Both victims had one or more
serious physical or mental impairments. Mr. Jones had also experienced the sudden significant loss of
his wife just a few weeks before his
daughter insisted that he sign over
the deed to his home. Both victims
had limited education and restricted
vision, making them even more
vulnerable to exploitation.
• Both victims were fully dependent
upon the “exploiter” to supply their
basic needs.
• Each exploiter was in a unique
position to isolate the victim, since
the parent lived with and depended
upon the exploiter to provide transportation to leave the house.
• In each case, the victim had a special relationship with the exploiter.
Both victims trusted their exploiter
and relied upon him or her to act in
the victim’s best interests. Both

exploiters, then, held a position of
trust with respect to the parent-victim.
• In each case, the exploiter took
advantage of that trust and dependency to manipulate the parent-victim into signing a deed which the
parent would not otherwise have
signed, to the benefit of the
exploiter and to the detriment of the
parent-victim.
Legislative Approaches: “The Art
of the Possible”
A. Making Financial Institutions
Mandated Reporters
For many years up until 2009,
advocates’ primary approach to the
problem of financial exploitation
was to seek a law to make financial
institutions mandated reporters,
requiring them to report suspected
financial exploitation to Adult Protective Services. Every year, the
banking lobby strenuously opposed
these bills, claiming that protection
of their customers’ privacy precluded them from reporting suspected
financial exploitation. The bills
died in committee every year,
despite the support of such heavy
hitters as AARP.
Eventually advocates turned to
other, less strongly opposed measures which would offer either a
“stick,” namely, enhanced criminal
penalties against the exploiters, or a
“carrot,” enhancing the ability of
victims to recover their lost assets
civilly by improved access to the
courts. Both approaches have met
with some success, though never
swiftly or without compromise.
Legislation is, if anything, the “art
of the possible.”

B. Criminal Penalties
Starting in 2009, advocates turned
to fighting financial exploitation by
seeking to deter exploiters through
imposition of tougher criminal
sanctions. Some bills approached
the problem by setting out
enhanced penalties when the victim
of certain crimes, such as larceny or
identity theft, was an adult over age
60 or incapacitated and the perpetrator had reason to know that the
victim was incapacitated or older.
Year after year, despite patrons
from both parties, these bills failed
to pass.
Another approach, more to the liking of many elder rights advocates,
would create a crime of financial
exploitation when a person knowingly, by deception, intimidation,
undue influence, coercion, harassment, duress, or misrepresentation,
obtained an elderly or vulnerable
adult’s property with the intent to
deprive the adult of its use. Violation by a caregiver or a person with
a fiduciary relationship to the vulnerable adult would carry an
increased penalty. Though supported by many advocacy groups, these
bills generally died in the House
Courts of Justice committee, primarily because legislators could
always envision an outlier situation
where a well-meaning relative
might be charged criminally under
the proposed law, e.g., an adult
child takes away the parent’s car
because the parent is no longer able
to drive safely; an adult child closes
the mother’s bank account and prevents her access to the new account
because the mother, suffering with
dementia, has been the victim of
numerous scams and financial
manipulation. In 2012, such a bill

passed the Senate unopposed and
actually was reported out of House
Courts, yet still failed to emerge
from the House Appropriations
committee and, therefore, failed to
become law, despite bi-partisan copatrons, widespread support, the
backing of the Attorney General’s
office, and money in the Governor’s budget to offset the fiscal
impact.
Finally, in 2013 a narrower, some
would say watered-down, approach
was taken. Instead of trying to
address the problem of undue influence and vulnerable victims who
are manipulated into giving away
property against their will, the 2013
bill addressed the problem of
crimes against victims who are
actually mentally incapacitated.
The proposed new Code §18.2178.1 would make it unlawful for
someone who knows or should
know that a person suffers with
mental incapacity to take advantage
of that mental incapacity in order to
deprive the mentally incapacitated
person of something of value.
“Mental incapacity” was defined as
the condition of the victim at the
time of the offense which prevents
the person from understanding the
nature and consequences of the
transaction or disposition of money
or other property. This bill, again
with multiple bi-partisan patrons,
unanimously passed both Senate
and House, was signed by the Governor, and became law July 1, 2013.
Significantly, the new law does not
address the circumstance of a person who does understand the nature
and consequences of the transaction, but who is manipulated and
unduly influenced by a trusted person who takes advantage of his vulnerable state to push him to take an

action he would not otherwise take.
But it does provide prosecutors
with another tool to take action
against those who prey upon those
who are vulnerable due to mental
incapacity. Legislation is the art of
the possible.
C. Civil Remedies
Even as legislators and advocates
were seeking improved criminal
penalties to deter exploitation and
punish exploiters, there was awareness that not all perpetrators can be
found, charged, and convicted and
that not all victims actually want
their exploiter to go to jail. Often,
all the victim wants is to get back
what was taken away and to put the
betrayal of trust in the past and
move on.
To address the civil side of the
problem, the Virginia Vulnerable
Adult Protection Act was proposed
in 2013. This bill would prohibit an
individual in a position of trust to a
vulnerable adult from using the vulnerable adult’s property or assets
for his own purposes. An individual who violated this act would be
liable for actual and possibly punitive damages and could be barred
from inheriting from the vulnerable
adult and from serving in a fiduciary capacity to the vulnerable adult.
The bill sought to impose a duty on
responsible persons in a position of
trust to use the vulnerable adult’s
assets solely for the benefit of the
vulnerable adult; to enhance recovery by the vulnerable adult from the
exploiter; to deter exploitation by
responsible persons; and to prevent
further loss of assets by enabling a
court to revoke any property disposition or fiduciary nomination.
Because it was a short session of
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the General Assembly which provided less time to negotiate substantive language changes and possibly because the criminal financial
exploitation bill (which was ultimately successful) was moving
through the same committee at the
same time, the full House Courts
committee tabled this bill despite
the subcommittee’s recommendation to report it out.
In the interim between legislative
sessions, advocates considered
other civil remedy approaches that
might pass General Assembly
muster. A law which had been in
effect in Maine for more than 25
years came to our attention and we
drafted a bill based upon that law
and began to vet it among elder law
advocates. This bill was intended
to address the situation where an
older person, who is not incapacitated but is dependent on another,
conveys real estate or a significant
portion of his estate to a person in a
fiduciary or confidential relationship with him. The Maine law, and
our proposed bill, would have created a statutory presumption of
undue influence if five elements
were proven: (1) that the victim is
over 60; (2) and is wholly or partially dependent on one or more
persons for care or support because
the elderly person is suffering from
a significant limitation in mobility,
vision, hearing, emotional or mental function, or the ability to read or
write, or is suffering or recovering
from a major illness or major
surgery; (3) the dependent elder
transfers for less than full consideration any real estate or more than
10% of the dependent elder’s
estate; (4) the transfer is to a person
with whom the dependent elder has
a confidential or fiduciary relation-
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ship, including a family relationship, a fiduciary, a health care
provider, an attorney, minister,
caregiver, friend or neighbor; and
(5) occurs without independent
counsel to represent only the dependent elder’s interests. If those five
elements are proven, a presumption
of undue influence arises and, if not
rebutted by the transferee, the
dependent elder can reverse the
transfer and potentially obtain
rescission of a deed, actual damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and
in some circumstances punitive
damages.
While we were vetting this bill, the
Virginia Supreme Court rendered
an opinion in the case of Ayers v.
Shaffer which clarified Virginia’s
undue influence legal standard.
The Supreme Court held that, in
Virginia, a person can prove undue
influence either by showing great
weakness of mind and that the
defendant obtained the bargain for
grossly inadequate consideration or
under other suspicious circumstances OR by showing that a confidential relationship existed
between the parties at the time of
the transaction beneficial to the
defendant (even in the absence of
other suspicious circumstances). In
other words, it is not necessary to
prove both that the defendant overcame the will of the victim because
of her weakness of mind and that
the defendant took advantage of a
confidential relationship. With this
case decision, it became clear that
pursuing the bill based on the
Maine law might simply confuse
Virginia’s undue influence standard
and might actually serve to make
recovery by victims more not less
difficult.

After Ayers v. Shaffer and with the
2014 General Assembly session fast
approaching, advocates regrouped
and decided upon a very targeted
approach to help victims recover
their lost assets by simply enabling
them to recover from the exploiter
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs
when the victim could prove that a
deed or other instrument was
obtained by fraud or undue influence. The hope was that such a targeted approach would be achievable and that a law to that effect
would encourage more private
attorneys to take these difficult,
time-consuming cases if they
thought there was the possibility of
recovering their fees and costs. If
more victims could obtain representation, then more people would be
able to recover their homes or other
lost assets. Moreover, if the
exploiter stood to lose the fruits of
his crime and to be required to pay
the attorney’s fees and costs
incurred by the victim, perhaps he
would be less inclined to exploit
vulnerable Virginians in the first
place. This bill passed and became
law July 1, 2014, adding Virginia
Code § 8.01-221.2 to provide that
in any civil action to rescind a deed,
contract or other instrument, the
plaintiff can be awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs of bringing
the action, if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that
the instrument was obtained by
fraud or undue influence. By
encouraging more private attorneys
to take these cases, this law should
enable more victims of fraud and
undue influence to recover their
assets.
Case Studies and the New Laws
So would these two new laws have

had any impact on the cases of Mr.
Jones and Mrs. Smith? It is unlikely that either Mr. Jones or Mrs.
Smith would have benefited from
the new criminal Code § 18.2-178.1
because neither would be considered “mentally incapacitated”; they
both understood the nature and consequences of the transaction into
which they thought they were entering. It is unlikely that either Sarah
or Mrs. Smith’s son would be
charged with larceny under the new
statute.
However, both Mr. Jones and Mrs.
Smith could benefit from the civil
remedy in § 8.01-221.2. It is very
likely that a court would find that
Sarah had obtained the deed to Mr.
Jones’ home through undue influence. If so, Mr. Jones should be
able to recover his attorney’s fees
and costs from Sarah, as well as
rescission of the deed to his home.
Without this provision, Mr. Jones
might have had difficulty finding a
private attorney willing to invest
the time and cost of handling such a
case without any realistic hope of
being paid. Similarly, Mrs. Smith
would also benefit from the new
code section allowing the court to
require the exploiter to pay her
attorney’s fees and costs. Not only
did her son manipulate her into
signing the papers but he also
defrauded her, telling her that the
document she was signing was to
enable him to handle her checks,
when in fact it was a deed to her
home.
While neither of these victims
would likely benefit from the new
criminal statute, other perpetrators
who target mentally incapacitated
victims could more readily be prosecuted for taking advantage of the

mental incapacity of their victim to
deprive them of their property.
Conclusions
So what are the takeaways from
this history of legislative advocacy
around the issue of financial
exploitation in general and undue
influence specifically? One is that
legislative advocacy is often a long,
difficult process with many bends
in the road: compromise on language, change in approaches, gathering of additional support, neutralization of opposition, sometimes
over several General Assembly sessions. It can be challenging to discern when it simply requires several
years to be successful, as opposed
to when it is time to try a new
approach rather than continuing to
‘beat a dead horse.’ Approaching a
problem from different directions at
the same time can be helpful but it
can also be a distraction. For
example, it ultimately was helpful
to attack this problem from both the
criminal and civil sides, but, at
times, legislators would point to the
other (criminal) bills as a reason not
to take action on this (civil) bill.
Another lesson is that legislative
advocacy is often “the art of the
possible” and that advocates must
recognize that the perfect can sometimes be the enemy of the good.
We certainly have not achieved the
perfect result in our attempts to find
new ways to deter and punish
exploiters or to afford more victims
the ability to recover their losses.
We have, however, advanced the
ability of prosecutors to charge and
convict those who exploit and victimize the mentally incapacitated,
and we have improved victims’
access to the courts to recover their
homes or other assets when those

were obtained by fraud or undue
influence. Two small but not
insignificant steps forward for victims of financial exploitation.
Study Questions
1. How would you define financial
exploitation?
2. What are some of the elements of
undue influence?
3. Can you identify some of the legislative challenges in addressing the
problem of undue influence?
Resources
http://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/
title63.2/chapter16/section63.
2-1606/ sets out those groups that
are mandated reporters under
Virginia law.
http://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/
title18.2/chapter6/section
18.2-178.1/ is the mental incapacity
statute.
Postscript
This article was written prior to the
2016 General Assembly. During the
2016 session, there was continuing
interest in financial exploitation and
in some of the issued raised above.
Ten financial exploitation bills of
various types (including five virtually identical bills brought by five
different legislators) were introduced. Of these, two bills passed
out of the legislature and have been
approved by the Governor. One bill
(HB 248/ SB 249) requires that the
local department of social services
or adult protective services immediately refer any financial exploitation report to local law enforcement
for investigation, if the losses are
suspected to be greater than
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$50,000. The second successful
financial exploitation bill (HB 676)
directs the Department for Aging
and Rehabilitative Services
(DARS) to form a workgroup to
study financial exploitation, determine the cost of financial exploitation of adults in the Commonwealth, and develop recommendations for improving the ability of
financial institutions to identify and
report financial exploitation.
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